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VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS AFTER 
SYLVANIA: A POSTSCRIPT AND COMMENT 
Martin B. Louis* 
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Continental T. V., Inc. 
v. GTE Sylvania Inc.1 demonstrates once again the difficult antitrust 
problem posed by vertical distribution restraints and the Court's con-
tinuing inability to resolve it satisfactorily.2 Vertical distribution re-
straints consist of terms imposed by a manufacturer on its distributors 
limiting their freedom to redistribute goods. Such restraints vary 
widely in their details, but the basic forms involve restraints on the 
prices at which goods are distributed, the customers to whom they can 
be distributed, and the locations from which or territories in which 
they can be distributed. These restraints assist a manufacturer, es-
pecially a new entrant, in establishing and maintaining an. effective 
distribution system. Unfortunately, they do so by suppressing intra-
brand competition among the manufacturer's dealers and distributors. 3 
The effect of this interference with intrabrand competition will 
be minimized, some say, by the presence of interbrand competition 
and by the seller's own interest in preserving some intrabrand com-
petition. 4 Yet, these countervailing pressures· do not •arise whenever 
vertical restraints are used. Interbrand competition is D:Ot invariably 
strong enough to impose a competitive equilibrium on the affected 
market-if it were, vertical restraints would be meaningless. In ad-
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. A.B. 1956, Princeton Uni-
versity; IL.B. 1959, LL.M. 1965, Harvard University.-E.d. 
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
2. Before the decision in Sylvania was announced, the Michigan Law Review 
published an Article by me arguing that the case was controlled by the Court's earlier 
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and 
that Schwinn had been correctly decided despite its unforgivably bad opinion. Louis, 
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for 
the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 15 MICH. L. R.Ev. 275 (1976). 
In Sylvania the Court agreed with the former contention, but it rejected the latter 
and overruled Schwinn. Although I believe that the Court's action was a mistake, 
I come to bury Schwinn and not to praise it, and thus I will attempt to focus here 
on the Sylvania decision and its future impact 
Many of the ideas set forth in the first Aqicle are relevant here and have been 
reasserted, usually in summary fashion with citation to their earlier, fuller explica-
tions. I have undoubtedly sometimes exceeded these limits. It is much. easier to 
adopt high purposes than to adhere to them religiously. 
3. 433 U.S. at 54-55. 
4. 433 U.S. at 56. 
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dition, the seller and its distributors often have shared an interest in 
reducing intrabrand competition, 5 since restricted distribution helps 
create or enhance promotional product differentiation, which in turn 
may shield the brand from interbrand competition or enable it to 
share in the resulting partial monopoly with other similarly differen-
tiated ·brands. 6 Thus, it is no surprise that Sylvania and most of 
its predecessors involved branded consumer goods susceptible to 
such differentiation. 
The traditional antitrust approach to practices resulting in such 
mixed blessings is the rule of reason, which promises particularized 
solutions responsive to both the needs of business and the interests 
of the public. Unfortunately, the rule of reason is a heavy burden 
upon the enforcement process. Antitrust proceedings conducted 
under that test are usually bulky and protracted. 7 Moreover, com-
mon business practices like these vertical distributional restraints 
may produce too many such proceedings for the federal courts and 
enforcement agencies to handle well, if at all. Furthermore, judges 
and trade commissioners presented with the huge records these cases 
ordinarily generate clearly cannot render decisions that are " 'accu-
rate,' 'consistent,' or 'predictable,' "8 and consequently they often fall 
back upon their relevant passions or economic prejudices. 0 These 
difficulties are magnified in the case of distribution restraints be-
cause of the many types and combinations available and of the wide 
variety of circumstances in which they are used.10 As a result, pre-
cedents are more easily distinguished, guidelines and rules are 
harder to formulate, trial records are potentially larger, rational de-
5. P. Aru!EDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 500-04 (2d ed. 1974). The Sylvania opinion 
sweeps these qualifications aside with the inaccurate statement that "the view that 
the manufacturer's interest necessarily corresponds with that of the public is not 
universally shared." 433 U.S. at 56. It is probably correct to say that few share 
this view because it is necessarily accurate only when the manufacturer is a monopo-
list. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and 
Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1425 (1968). When the manufacturer is 
an oligopolist, its interest will generally fall somewhere between that of its dealers 
and distributors and that of the public, and it is as likely to approach one as the 
other. The adoption by the manufacturer of a program of distribution restraints, 
however, hardly suggests that the public interest is the one in the ascendency, 
6. Comanor, supra note 5, at 1425. 
7. The record in Schwinn, which was tried under the rule of reason, filled 23 
volumes. McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested 
Resale Prices and Refusals To Deal, 37 ANnnusr L.J. 137, 144 (1967). 
8, Louis, supra note 2, at 277-78 (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Su-
preme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and 
Potential Competition Decisions, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) ), 
9. Louis, supra note 2, at 277-78. 
10. Id. at 282-85. 
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cisionmaking becomes more difficult, and defendants are more in-
clined to litigate than to negotiate. 
There are two escapes from this dilemma. One is the use of 
per se rules, which sacrifice accuracy in particular cases for predict-
ability and consistency in most of them. Another is the structural 
rule-of-reason approach widely used in Clayton Act cases, 11 under 
which market structure factors are examined to predict anticompeti-
tive effects but evidence of actual effects, which could fill many 
volumes, is largely ignored. A decade ago the Supreme Court, after 
a hesitant flirtation with the rule of reason, 12 adopted a modified per 
se approach to the vertical restraint problem in United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.13 In that case the Court held, in effect, that 
the ~ost restrictive practices were per se unlawful and that the less 
restrictive ones were presumptively lawful, a result whose predict-
ability could obviate much litigation while leaving business some-
perhaps even enough-capability to satisfy its legitimate needs. Un-
fortunately, Schwinn made no mention of this practical rationale, but 
instead invoked a common-law catchphrase-restraints on alienation 
when the seller parts with title-as its ratio decidendi.14 In conse-
quence, the opinion was widely criticized, especially by those who 
opposed its practical result or did not understand it, 15 and the weight 
of this criticism bore heavily upon the federal courts.16 Finally, in 
Sylvania11 the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn and reinstated the 
rule-of-reason approach adopted in United States v. White Motor 
Co., 18 a case which Schwinn had itself rather hastily overruled. 
The question actually presented in Sylvania was whether 
Schwinn's per se rule condemning territorial and customer restraints 
applied to location clauses. The trial court had answered in the af-
firmative, but the Ninth Circuit reversed en bane, rn holding that loca: 
tion clauses were distinguishable from customer clauses. The Su-
11. Such an approach is presently employed in merger and exclusive dealing 
cases. Id. at 279. The merger guidelines announced by the Department of Justice 
embrace such an approach. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 4510 (1977). 
12. See United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
13. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
14. See 388 U.S. at 378-80. 
15. For an examination of the deficiencies of the Schwinn opinion, see Louis, 
supra note 2, at 276 n.6. 
16. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 n.14. 
17. 433 U.S. at 59. 
18. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
19. · GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(en bane). 
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preme Court agreed with the trial court that location clauses and cus-
tomer clauses are essentially indistinguishable under Schwinn. 20 
Consequently, the Court cdnfronted the broader issue of whether 
Schwinn was correctly decided. 
In Schwinn, the Court couched its per se rule in terms of a doctrine 
providing that the seller cannot restrict distribution of goods over 
which it no longer has title. Accordingly, goods sold on consignment 
or by an agent were not subject to the per se rule. 21 This technically 
necessary but essentially anomalous exception was not available to 
most manufacturers, 22 and might readily have been narrowed even 
further.23 Nevertheless, in Sylvania the Court alleged that this 
quaint qualification of the per se rule manifested an analytical irre-
soluteness in Schwinn that could be remedied only by either elimi-
nating the exception or by overruling Schwinn. 24 Spurning the former 
alternative--the adoption of which would have displeased almost no 
one--the Court triumphantly chose the latter. 
Unfortunately, the reasons given for rejecting Schwinn, with or 
without its anomalous exception, are neither illuminating nor per-
suasive. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Sylvania 
merely reiterates the accepted fact that these restraints are both 
20. 433 U.S. at 46. The Court disregarded the additional argument that the 
location clause and the territorial restriction, which are similarly used to confine 
distributors and dealers within their specified sales areas- (generally at the retail 
and wholesale levels respectively), are also indistinguishable for all practical pur-
poses. For-a lengthy evaluation of the question, see Louis, supra note 2, at 287-94. 
21. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380-81. 
22. Relatively few manufacturers presently use consignment or agency arrange-
ments in the distribution of branded consumer products, especially at the retail level, 
perhaps because of the ease with which security interests in inventory can be secured 
under the Uniform Commercial Code and the resulting willingness of various credit 
institutions to provide inventory financing. For a review of those uses of consign-
ment that remain, see Handler, The Seventeenth Annual Review of Antitrust Devel• 
opments-1964, 19 REc. N.Y.C. BAR AssN. 379, 381 (1964). In fact, in none of 
the many reported cases after Schwinn was the exemption even raised. Furthermore, 
it is very unlikely that a manufacturer would have been permitted to change its 
distribution system to agency or consignment in order to qualify for the exception, 
especially if there were no independent commercial reason to justify the practice. 
Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
23. Schwinn emphasized that the agents or consignees had to be "indistinguish-
able in function from agents or salesmen." 388 U.S. at 381. This qualification 
eliminates most retailers and those wholesalers that serve customers substantially 
from their own inventory. See Louis, supra note 2, at 276 n.6. 
24. 433 U.S. at 57. The Court argued that this exception was SrJhwinn's inapt 
concession to the fact that there is some redeeming social virtue in vertical distribu-
tion restraints. It seems to me, see text at note 21 supra, and to Justice White 
in his concurring opinion, 433 U.S. at 59, that the exception was otherwise justified 
and that the presumptive legality of the less dangerous restraints was the real con• 
cession. See text at notes 26-27 infra, 
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widely used and have some redeeming social virtue. 215 But that is 
why Schwinn's per se approach was only partial and specifically ex-
empted all of the less restrictive partially substitutable restraints. 26 
The question in Sylvania really was whether in the generality of cases 
the use of these substitutes could meet enough of business' legitimate 
needs. Many have suggested that they could, 27 no one has yet even 
attempted to show they could not, and surely some data or experi-
ence deserving ·the Court's attention had accumulated during the 
Schwinn decade. The Court ignored this question, however, except 
to suggest that the differences among the most frequently used re-
straints are merely "of degree and form" and that it was "unable 
to perceive significant social gain from channeling transactions into 
one form or another."28 
The social gains from that channeling are, in my opinion, rather 
obvious. For one, the Schwinn approach tends to minimize the in-
hibiting effect of vertical restraints on intrabrand competition. That 
is, the limited per se rule allows those less restrictive practices that 
preserve a significant level of intrabrand competition and forbids the 
more restrictive devices that leave room for little, if any, such com-
petition. 29 For example, resale price fixing severely curtails intra-
brand competition, and although it differs from other vertical re-
straints only in "degree and form," it is per se invalid under long-
standing authority. Even Sylvania did not disturb this individual per 
se rule, 30 although the Court there offered no satisfactory explana-
tion for retaining this "anomalous" exception to its own rationale.31 
Society also benefits from an antitrust policy discouraging use of 
the more restrictive vertical restraints insofar as these _restraints 
25. 433 U.S. at 57-58. 
26. Louis, supra note 2, at 277. 
21. See, e.g., id.; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and 
Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribu-
tion Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962). 
28. 433 U.S. at 58 n.29. 
29. On the different uses and effects of the various restraints, see generally Louis, 
supra note 2, at 282-85; Note, supra note 27. 
30. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. 
31. In his concurring opinion, Justice White forcefully demonstrated the anoma-
lous nature of this distinction and showed that the majority,_ in drawing it, rejected 
the position of those commentators on which it most heavily relied. 433 U.S. at 
70. Justice White might also have noted that some of those commentators who 
supported the Schwinn result would also regard such a distinction as illogical. E.g., 
Comanor, supra note 5, at 1427; Louis, supra note 2, at 282. Indeed, substantial 
academic support for it cannot be found. If the distinction is to remain, it may 
eventually provide doctrinal precedent for the adoption of additional per se rules, a 
possibility the Court specifically left open. 433 U.S. at 58. 
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create and preserve promotional product differentiation. As Pro-
fessor Bain discovered in his pioneering study of entry barriers, in 
many areas of the economy product differentiation often accounts 
for high barriers to · entry82 and, therefore, for the creation or per-
sistence of oligopoly and the high profit levels that often attend it.88 
This insight strongly suggests that the height of the barrier varies 
with the severity of the restraint. Consequently, by regulating the 
degree and form of permitted vertical restraints, the courts can curb 
this source of entry barriers. 
The Court's feeble response to this analysis is contained in a foot-
note suggesting that the argument is logically flawed and that in any 
event a per se rule merely forces business to employ less effective 
means to achieve product differentiation.34 The first assertion is in-
accurate, and the second, although probably correct, cuts against the 
Court's position. Compelling a company to use less efficient means 
of product differentiation will raise its costs, and, since the incentive 
to pursue differentiation depends on ·the relationship between mar-
ginal cost and marginal return, will reduce the optimal level of prod-
duct differentiation. Furthermore, even if the company could 
achieve a comparable level of differentiation for its products without 
restricting distribution, it would still confront the countervailing pres-
sure of intrabrand competition in marketing them. 
Schwinn's channeling process also benefited society by substan-
tially increasing the predictability of antitrust regulation, thereby 
32. J, BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMPETITION 114-43 (1956). 
33. See, e.g., N. COLLINS & L. PRESTON, CoNCENTRATION AND PRICE-COST MAR-
GINS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 116 (-1968); H. GOLDSCHMID, H. MANN & J, 
WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 168-245 (1974), 
34. 433 U.S. at 56 n.25. The footnote states: "This argument is flawed by 
its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting from 
vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about product 
availability, price, quality and services." Unfortunately, the "argument" demands 
no such "necessary assumption." Although vertical restrictions are often designed 
to produce excess profits in order to pay for additional advertising and promotion, 
they can also contribute to product differentiation in such ways as the elimination 
of discount outlets, the control of price rivalry, and the requirement or stimulation 
of dealer services in excess of what the market would provide. See generally P • 
.AREEDA, supra note 5, at 22; J. BAIN, supra note 32, at 142; Comanor, supra note 
5; Louis, supra note 2, at 301-02. In any event, it also seems clear that these 
assumptions that some part of product differentiation "merely exploits consumer ig-
norance" and that "many oligopolists advertise more extensively than would be useful 
for the industry viewed col!ec:tively," P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 21-22, although 
not necessary to the argument, are too often correct. The undesirable contributions 
of vertical restraints to such differentiation may be offset, as many argue, by their 
procompetitive contributions to the distribution process and by the high cost of regu-
lating them. That, at least, is the nub of present academic disagreement. The 
Court, however, sophomorically assumed away the entire controversy with a single, 
partially incorrect, conclusory sentence in a footnote. 
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diminishing enforcement costs. The Court in Sylvania completely 
ignored this feature of Schwinn, even though it is the most compel-
ling reason for adopting any bright-line approach, 85 and was the con-
trolling consideration in another antitrust decision which the Court 
handed down only a few weeks before Sylvania.36 The Court's si-
lence on this consideration dramatically underscores the impact of 
its decision. Since Sylvania gave no indication of the bounds of rea-
sonableness37 aside from implying that the location clauses used by 
Sylvania were reasonable under the circumstances of the case, we 
will lack clear guidelines in this area until an accumulation of decis-
ions sketches in ·the contours of the Sherman Act's tolerance of verti-
cal distribution restraints. For the foreseeable future, then, the 
cost of enforcing limits, should the federal government again take 
up ·the gauntlet, will be staggering. Surely many sellers will un-
doubtedly accept Sylvania's tacit invitation to do as they please. 
Furthermore, given the inequality of litigation resources between the 
government and business, can anyone doubt upon which side of the 
scales the Court has placed its thumb or whether renewed govern-
mental litigation in this area will, for the foreseeable future, con-
stitute much more than a gesture of defilance? 
In summary, the ultimate question before the Court in Sylvania 
was whether the less restrictive restraints permitted by Schwinn fell 
so consistenly short of the legitimate needs of business that the cost 
of hampering business outweighed the enormous enforcement costs 
of the rule of reason. Sylvania, like Schwinn, failed to address this 
question, dwelling instead on the spurious problem supposedly 
created by the distinction between sale and nonsale transactions. 
Neither decision is an exemplar of judicial reasoning;38 both suffer 
35. See Louis, supra note 2, at 278;79, 310. 
36. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
37. Sylvania, aside from its direct or implied overruling of most recent decisions 
favoring the government, merely returned the law to the year 1963 and the decision 
in White Motor, where the Court said it did "not know enough of the economic 
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain." 372 
U.S. at 263. Fourteen years and many cases later, when some knowledge and ex-
perience should have accumulated, the Court has retreated to that position without 
a hint about where the lines should now be drawn, 433 U.S. at 59, except for two 
citations to Justice Brandeis' hoary explication of the rule of reason, 433 U.S. at 
49 n.15 & 53 n.21 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
238 (1918) ), which is totally unilluminating and contains deviant overtones rejected 
by later cases. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 817-20 (1965). 
38. I have already mentioned Sylvania's heavy reliance upon the false dilemma 
supposedly created by Schwinn's agency and consignment exception, see. text at notes 
21-24 supra, the inappropriate characterization of that exception as an inadequate 
sop to the legitimate needs of business, see note 24 supra, and the failure simply to 
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from what ·they said as well as from what they ignored. And, for 
these reasons, Sylvania may not be the Court's last word on the sub-
ject of vertical distribution restraints. 
* * * 
The effect of Sylvania is less debatable -than its merits: the Court 
simply wiped the slate clean and commanded a fresh start. No one 
can foresee precisely where the courts will go; the best we can do 
is catalog the factors that they are likely to examine in cases in-
volving vertical distribution restraints. Presumably they will con-
sider the restrictive effect of the package of restraints employed, 
based upon their number and kind;39 the market structure and per-
formance of the industry affected;40 the position of the seller employ-
ing the restraints within that industry;41 the frequency and magnitude 
with which these restraints are used by its competitors;42 any special 
needs or problems peculiar to the seller;43 and how well other, less 
restrictive practices or restraints can meet its legitimate needs. 44 
eliminate the exception, see text at notes 25-28 supra. Also deserving note is Justice 
Powell's new school of ecumenical economics, which conveniently borrows from 
friend and foe alike whatever is useful and rejects whatever is not. 
39. Lengthy discussions of how the various restraints are employed, how they 
interrelate, and how they fulfill particular needs at various distribution levels can 
be found in Louis, supra note 2; Note, supra note 27. 
40. The assumption here is that exclusive dealing cases like Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and FTC v. Motion 
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), which both emphasize the pres-
ence of concentration in the affected markets, will be considered the most relevant 
precedents. This assumption exists though they are Clayton Act decisions and the 
entry barrier effects of exclusive dealing are more direct and immediate. These 
cases, particularly Standard Stations, attempted to ignore actual market performance 
and effects, which are presumably relevant under the rule of reason. Cf. Maple 
Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
41. Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) 
( exclusive dealing case emphasizing the absence of "a seller with a dominant position 
in the market" or "myriad outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an 
industry wide practice"). 
42. Cf. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup, CT. REV. 267, 300 ("the proportion of 
goods in the relevant market that are sold subject to restrictive arrangements" should 
be considered in a Clayton Act § 3 proceeding). In addition, see the sources in 
note 40 supra. 
43. Such special factors include restrictions designed to protect the health and 
safety of the user or the quality of the product, Louis, supra note 2, at 275 n.4, 
or the special problems of a seller who is a new entrant, a declining company, 
or a failing company, id. at 297-300. 
44. The availability of less restrictive alternatives has always been a basic consid-
eration under the rule of reason, as Justice Brennan carefully noted in his concurring 
opinion in White Motor, 372 U.S. at 271-72. Ironically, then, considerations of 
degree and form, which Sylvania rejected as determinants of per se unlawfulness, 
see text at noteit 28-31 supra, are still relevant as determinants of reasonableness. 
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Obviously, the allocation of the burdens of proof on these questions 
will also be crucial. 45 
Although these are the most likely factors, the list could ob-
viously be expanded beyond the point of manageability.46 Indeed, 
I doubt that any reasonably inclusive list would be manageable or 
particularly helpful. What are needed are predictions on how the 
courts and enforcement agencies will react to various combinations 
of the crucial factors. Perhaps a few' such predictions can be tenta-
tively advanced. All sellers, I assume, can confidently continue to 
employ in any legitimate fashion all those less restrictive practices 
that were presumptively lawful under Schwinn, 47 even though it is 
now arguable that they are unreasonable in some circumstances. 48 
On the other hand, sellers assigning closed territories to their dis-
tributors or dealers will, I suspect, still be courting trouble49 unless 
the sellers are new entrants, failing companies, or are otherwise 
specially situated. 50 A safe course would be to use de facto exclusive 
or limited fr~chising in combination with territorial or locational 
protection. 51 
It is more difficult to predict in what situations it will be unreason-
45. Clearly the plaintiff must show that the restraints exist and that they have, 
or are likely to have, anticompetitive effects. Whether the plaintiff must also show 
prima facie that any justifications for the restraints are insufficient and that they 
are, therefore, unreasonable is the question. Although the Court might eventually 
place the entire burden of jus~ication upon the defendant, who is clearly-in a better 
position than the plaintiff to discharge it, Sylvania is hardly good authority for that 
result. 
46. See Bok, supra note 42, at 297-300. An example of such an impossibly 
long list-which was predictably ignored-is found in United States v. Penn-Olin 
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 -(1964). 
47. These restraints include exclusive franchises, profit-passover clauses, and area 
of primary responsibility clauses. Louis, supra note 2, at 282-83. 
48. The unlimited use of exclusive franchises is often arguably unreasonable, 
Louis, supra note 2, at 286-87, but traditionally their use has been virtually immune 
to antitrust attack. One possible reason for this development is that this immunity 
was a tradeoff for the designation of per se illegality of other ·restraints, the use 
of which would occasionally have been reasonable. Id. This rationale has been 
undercut by Sylvania, under which only vertical price fixing is still per se unlawful. 
49. See note 69 infra. 
50. See note 43 supra. 
51. Manufacturers that take this course are still courting problems, however. 
Many dealers or distributors set such a high premium on obtaining an enforceable 
exclusive franchise that they may not be willing to settle for a de facto one. See 
Note, supra note 27, at 805-09. Thus they may demand, at the minimum, oral 
assurances that, if disclosed, might subject the manufacturer to antitrust prosecution 
for using and concealing closed territories. See generally Louis, supra note 2, at 
292 n.94. Furthermore, as courts become aware of this problem, they may take 
a tougher stance toward the grant of locational or territorial protection to dealers 
enjoying de facto exclusive or limited franchising. See generally United States v. 
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 602 (1972). 
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able to use individually any of the three restraints that were per se 
unlawful under Schwinn-the territorial limitation, the location 
clause, and the customer clause. Although it can be argued that 
these three should be treated alike, 62 historical and functional differ-
ences among them presage dissimilar results. 63 Of the three, loca-
tion clauses are the least likely to arouse judicial reproach. The 
automotive companies historically have successfully met all legal 
challenges to their use of location clauses, 54 and there is no reason 
to expect a contrary result in the future. Thus, location clauses are 
presumably legitimate in all other industries as well. i;i, On the other 
52. Sylvania, of course, holds that the three are equivalent, 433 U.S. at 45-46, al-
though the purpose of this holding was to include all of them within either the 
per se rule or the rule of reason, and not necessarily to preclude differing results 
under the latter. Since all three have similar functions, arguably they should be 
treated alike. The territorial restraint and the location clause are both employed 
to keep distributors and dealers within their assigned sales territories, usually with 
the former affecting the wholesale level and the latter affecting the retail level of 
distribution. Louis, supra note 2, at 283. Furthermore, the customer restraint is 
often used as a supplement or alternative to the location clause in preventing unau-
thorized or bootleg retail sales outlets. Id. at 284, 289-90. Thus, any significant 
legal distinctions among these three restraints would discriminate between the inter-
mediate and final levels of distribution or among roughly equivalent means to the 
same end. 
53. Historically, the location clause has survived all challenges to its legality, 
see note 54 infra, whereas the other two obviously have not. One reason for this 
result is that the location clause merely hinders intrabrand competition, while the 
other two forbid it completely. Louis, supra note 2, at 290. Although that differ-
ence was not sufficient under Schwinn and Sylvania to distinguish the location clause 
from the other two restraints, it may portend differing results under the rule of 
reason. Furthermore, the location clause may be more important to retail distribu-
tion than the territorial limitation is to wholesale distribution because manufacturers 
are less inclined to grant exclusive franchises at the retail than at the wholesale 
level. Id. at 291-92. In that situation a manufacturer recruiting retail dealers can 
offer them no significant territorial protection other than the location clause. 
54. E.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); 
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 
317 U.S. 695 (1943). In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 
139-40 (1966), the Supreme Court refused to consider the question. 
55. There are two acceptable rationalizations for protecting an automobile 
dealer's location: inducing the initial substantial investment, which arguably de-
mands only temporary protection, Louis, supra note 2, at 292-93, 296-98, and induc-
ing the continuing provision of services thought essential to the marketing of the 
product, which arguably justifies continuing protection. In Sylvania, however, the 
dealers apparently neither invested more money nor promised additional services. 
See id. at 294 n.103. The only apparent justification there was the manufacturer's 
small, declining market share. Thus it is hard to see why any manufacturer should 
hesitate to use location clauses today unless it is dominant, its dealers have exclusive 
franchises, they made their investments long ago, and they presently provide almost 
no services. Eventually, however, the enforcement agencies and the courts may look 
more closely at these fa9tors and require a showing that such protection is truly 
necessary and reasonable. Moreover, the imposition of location clauses by a manu-
facturer upon multi-brand dealers may also restrain interbrand competition. Id. at 
293. Whether the legality of using location clauses would be affected by a showing 
of such interbrand effects is unclear, but certainly not unlikely. 
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hand, territorial limitations on distributors may well remain unavail-
able to the leading firms in highly concentrated industries, especially 
if they are combined with de jure or de facto exclusive franchises. 56 
Consequently, even the first such firm to contemplate the use of ter-
ritorial restraints must proceed with caution, especially if it suspects 
others will follow.57 Finally, the prospective judicial attitude to-
ward customer restraints is perhaps the most difficult to predict. I 
expect that the courts will permit customer clauses designed to pro-
tect the quality of the product or the health and safety of the user. 58 
A harder question is whether substantial, thriving sellers of differ-
entiated products can now use customer clauses simply to eliminate 
bootleg sales and dealers, to facilitate price <;liscrimination, or to re-
serve business for themselves. 59 For example, the reimposition by 
Schwinn of customer restraints in order to eliminate bootleg sales 
might now survive judicial scrutiny because the company apparently 
still faces strong interbrand competition. 60 Similar efforts by Gen-
eral Motors, however, would be much riskier. 61 
Obviously, using two of these three restraints in tandem increases 
the risk of illegality, especially if they are imposed upon or affect 
the same level of distribution. For example, ·the combined imposi-
tion of location clauses upon retailers and of customer restraints 
upon wholesalers or retailers in order to eliminate bootleg sales or 
dealers entirely might be unreasonable, even though the use of 
56. See note 51 supra. Most of the cases dealing with territorial restraints in-
volved manufacturers with relatively small market shares facing the competition of 
dominant firms, e.g., White Motor, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with some of the smaller 
firms having suffered serious market declines, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 
847 (6th Cir. 1964). In Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the defendant, although 
the largest name-brand seller, had suffered a serious loss of its market share because 
of strong competition from mass merchants and imports. Even Sylvania's principal 
excuse for employing analogous location clauses was a declining market ·share. 433 
U.S. at 38. Thus there is very little case law suggesting that a strong, dominant 
manufacturer can employ territorial restraints, even under the rule of reason. Indeed, 
a strong argument to the contrary is found in Justice White's concurring opinion 
in Sylvania. 433 U.S. at 63-64. Furthermore, the availability of less restrictive prac-
tices to substitute for territorial restraints should obviously still be a factor in assess-
ing reasonableness. 
57. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 552; note 43 supra. 
59. See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 550-52. 
60. From 1971 to 1976 Schwinn's market share declined from 12.8% to 11.8%, 
even though it took over the wholesaling function in order to avoid the effects of 
the decree. ~1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE R.Eo. REP. (BNA) No. 844, at A-8. 
Schwinn may still be the largest selling name brand in the domestic market. 
61. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (question 
raised by enforcement of analogous location clause left unanswered because of a 
finding of conspiracy between General Motors and some of its dealers). 
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either restraint alone would not be unreasonable and the combina-
tion merely completes the task either alone lawfully attempts. 62 
Thus the automobile companies would arguably invite litigation if 
they augment their location clauses63 with customer restraints. 
On the other hand, territorial limitations and location clauses are 
ordinarily imposed upon different levels of the distribution network. 
Thus, if a seller could lawfully impose the former upon its inter-
mediate distributors or could lawfully compel them to impose the lat-
ter upon the retailers to which they sell, 64 should it hesitate to re-
quire both? The seller would argue that since the two reasonable 
restraints basically do not reinforce each other, the combination is 
also reasonable. The government or a private plaintiff, however, 
might contend that the public should not be totally denied the bene-
fits of intrabrand competition at both levels and, therefore, that dis-
tribution at one level must be left relatively unrestrained. 611 Neither 
side is clearly right, although Sylvania appears to preclude a rule 
lllaking the combination per se unlawful. 66 Nevertheless, the use 
of the combination by a prosperous, oligopolistic seller presents the 
government with an ideal test case that the seller might prefer to 
avoid. 
Fortunately the combined use of one of these three restraints with 
one of those traditionally measured by the rule of reason-i.e., ex-
clusive franchises and areas of primary responsibility or profit-pass-
over clauses-presents fewer difficult problems than a combination 
62. See note 52 supra. 
63. See note 54 supra. 
64. In theory, a manufacturer has no direct control over where or to whom a 
retailer who purchases from a wholesaler may resell. See Louis, supra note 2, at 
289 n.83. With Schwinn overruled, however, possibly the manufacturer may now 
apl'_oint authorized retailers, condition that appointment accordingly, and prohibit 
the wholesalers from selling to anyone else. In any event, no good reason exists 
why a manufacturer cannot lawfully compel a wholesaler to impose location clauses 
upon retailers if the manufacturer, dealing directly with the retailers, could lawfully 
impose them: Id. 
65. In other words, the seller could grant exclusive franchises or impose a profit-
passover arrangement on one of the two levels. The reply here is that the level 
of restraint would not be very different, that the Sylvania opinion opposed such 
distinctions between degree and form, see text at note 28 supra, and that the manu-
facturer could overcome such limitations by assuming the wholesale function and 
dealing directly. In rejoinder the government would argue that some intrabrand 
competition is preferable to none, see Louis, supra note 2, at 297, 300 n.128, that 
Sylvania was not &ddressing distinctions under the rule of reason, and that the risk 
of vertical integration is not great. Id. at 302 n.141. 
66. Although Sylvania left open the possibility that some restraints might still 
be found per se unlawful, 433 U.S. at 58, it probably did not mean to include this 
situation, for "the r~ns presented in note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
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of two restraints that were covered by Schwinn's per se rule. As 
I mentioned before, a closed territory-produced by coupling an ex-
clusive franchise with either a location clause or a territorial limita-
tion-is a risky venture. 67 Indeed, a prohibition of closed territories 
is a leading candidate for one of the narrow per se rules that Sylvania 
would allow. 68 A per se prohibition of closed territories seems de-
sirable since they often restrict intrabrand competition even more 
than vertical price fixing, 69 which remains per se unlawful under 
Sylvania. 10 
Sellers will probably possess considerably more freedom in the 
use of areas of primary responsibility and profit-passover clauses. In 
most cases an area of primary responsibility would not significantly 
enhance the anticompetitive effect of a lawful territorial restraint af-
fecting the same level of distribution. 71 Similarly, firms should 
ordinarily be free to combine a reasonable profit-passover clause 
with either a location clause or a territorial limitation affecting the 
same level of distribution, since the former often serves merely as 
a means of enforcing the other two that is less drastic than the antic-
ipated refusal to deal. 72 Courts might even tolerate such combina-
tions affecting two different levels of distribution on the ground that 
they are a less restrictive alternative to the equivalent combination 
of a location clause and a territorial limitation. 78 Finally, the com-
bination of a reasonable profit-passover clause with a customer re-
straint affecting the same level of distribution would often represent 
a less restrictive-and therefore presumably a lawful-alternative to 
the -combination of the latter with either a location clause or a ter-
ritorial limitation. Of course, some profit-passover clauses are rea-
61. See text at notes 49-51 supra. 
68. See note 31 supra. 
69. Closed territories can bar every form of intrabrand competition. Resale price 
maintenance still permits nonprice competition over services and promotions, which 
will often amount to indirect price competition. Furthermore, one reason for the 
Court's refusal to exempt price maintenance from the per se rule was that Congress 
recently repealed those provisions of the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and 
the Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which exempted state fair trade laws 
from the Sherman Act. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-145, 
89 Stat. 801 (noted in 433 U.S. at 51 n.18). It would be anomalous if Sylvania 
gave back to business through closed territories as much as or more than what Con-
gress has so recently taken away. 
70. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. 
71. Louis, supra note 2, at 282-83. Sellers would have little interest in combining 
an area of primary responsibility clause with either a territorial limitation or a loca-
tion clause, since the former is basically a milder alternative to either of the other 
two. 
12. See Note, supra note 27, at 814-15, 827. 
73. See note 65 supra. 
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sonably limited to special situations involving prepaid installation or 
warranty costs and are not_generally aimed at discouraging ihtrabrand 
competition.74 Their combination with other lawful restraints should 
pose no additional risk. 
Although these predictions are not difficult to toss off and, on 
the whole, are probably not far off the mark, one should not rely 
on any individual pred,iction. This uncertainty will hardly help the 
Department of Justice, which now has almost no basis on which to 
seek summary judgment or to impose a consent decree, and, conse-
quently, must expect to try almost every new case it brings. Fur-
thermore, because of the variety and the various possible combina-
tions of restraints, the Department will have to win a number of cases 
before it has the precedential authority to back up its bargaining 
position. It cannot accomplish this in less than a decade, even if 
it has the inclination and ,the resources to begin immediately.7:; 
Meanwhile, potential defendants should spring up like weeds in an un-
tended garden, and the government, with its limited resources, can 
be expected to challenge only the most egregious uses. And even 
in these cases the defendants may resist vigorously in the hope of 
prevailing ultim~tely on the merits or of obtaining a generous consent 
decree. Admittedly, private plaintiffs should somewhat check those 
who might otherwise throw caution to the winds. But because of 
the high cost, delay, and low success rate of private litigation, as so 
tecently illustrated by Sylvania and Fortner,76 and the special diffi-, 
culties of making new law in this area under the rule of reason, the 
private plaintiff is not, in my opinion, a substantial deterrent to 
those who proceed prudently. 77 
As an alternative or supplement to an ambitious litigation pro-
gram, the Department of Justice could announce guidelines for these 
practices similar to those adopted in the merger field. 78 Such guide-
lines would probably have more influence upon sellers than the tenu-
ous threat of litigation and should receive some deference from fed-
eral judges seeking direction in the wilderness Sylvania has created. 
14. See Note, supra note 27, at 812. 
75. In remarks made at Duke Law School, Durham, North Carolina, on Decem-
ber 2, 1977, Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield indicated that he does 
not now set a high priority on the bringing of such suits. 
76. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc,, 429 U.S. 610 (1977), 
77. Accord, [1977] ANnTRuST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 843, at B-1, B-S, suggest-
ing that antitrust attorneys representing private plaintiffs strongly prefer cases in-
volving per se offenses anyway, and would probably especially avoid this area of 
the rule of reason because of the present uncertainty. 
78. 1 TRADE R.Eo. REP. (CCHj 1f 4510 (1977). Such guidelines could altema-
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Unfortunately, vertical distribution restraints are less susceptible to 
such control than mergers because of the variety and possible com-
binations of the restraints involved79 and because of the absence of 
a widely accepted economic theory to guide the drafters. 80 In addi-
tion, such a scheme would have to follow a narrow path between 
too much detail and flexibility, which would result in pro-
ceedings that resemble those under the rule of reason, 81 and too 
much rigidity, which would achieve results similar to those under 
Schwinn's partial per se approach. These difficulties, which are in-
herent in the use of such guidelines and of the structural rule-of-
reason approach they embrace, 82 raise grave questions about the de-
sirability of constructing a structural regulatory framework in this 
area. 83 Nevertheless, structural analysis is the middle ground be-
tively be promulgated as substantive regulations by the Federal Trade Commission, 
acting under its new statutory power, FTC Improvement Act, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 
2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l) (1976)), or under§ 6(g) of the 
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1976), as interpreted in National Petroleum Ref. 
Assn. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
The power under the FTC Improvement Act, however, by its terms applies only to 
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and not to "unfair methods of competition," 
which is the traditional source of the Commission's concurrent jurisdiction over anti-
trust violations. The latter power is of undefined scope, and it may never have been 
intended to reach substantive anticompetitive conduct. Even if it had been so in-
tended by the court in National Petroleum, it may have been impliedly limited or 
excised by Congress, which rejected its codification in the FTC Improvement Act. 
Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 89 HAllv. L. REV. 715, 740 n.155 (1976). Needless to 
say, the FTC could also issue guidelines or launch an enforcement program un-
der § S's condemnation of unfair methods of competition, which supposedly include 
incipient Sherman Act violations. If certain cases are taken at face value, the FTC 
could condemn, in a blaze of expertise and expletives, practices that violate not 
the letter of the Sherman Act as interpreted in Sylvania, but the Act's spirit and 
central policy. Cf. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1912) (FTC 
bas authorization to determine whether actions are unfair methods of competition 
or unfair or deceptive practices though the actions pose no threat to competition 
within the letter or spirit of antitrust laws); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 
316 (1966) (under FTC Act § 5, FTC bas power to arrest restraints of trade in 
their incipiency without proof that the restraints are outright violations of other 
antitrust laws). 
79. Louis, supra note 2, at 308. 
80. Id. at 308-09. 
81. Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59, although pur-
porting to be a full rule of reason analysis, could readily be mistaken for a structural 
analysis. 
82. See note 11 supra. 
83. I stated these doubts at length in my earlier Article. Louis, supra riote 2, 
at 307-09. A reading of Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania, 433 U.S. 
at 59, discussed in note 56 supra, confirms and enlarges them. That opinion purports 
to apply a rule of reason analysis to distinguish Sylvania from Schwinn, but in the 
process omits discussion of many facts that I, at least, regard as crucial. See Louis, 
supra note 2, at 294 n.103. It is unimportant whether these facts should control 
in Sylvania. It is important if facts like them are generally present in such cases 
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twee~ the rule of reason and Schwinn's partial per se approach. 
Since the restoration -of Schwinn in the foreseeable future is highly 
unlikely, the Department of Justice, and eventually the courts, will 
probably begin to move toward structural rules once the difficulty 
and futility of proceeding under -the rule of reason becomes apparent 
to them. Until then, ,the government and the courts will find them-
selves in the briar patch, in which only defendants with their gen-
erally unlimited litigation resources will, like Brer Rabbit, feel at 
home. 
in sufficient numbers to obscure the "correct"--or even the likely-result, and to 
permit any factfinder, by judicious selection, to choose and justify plausibly whatever 
result he prefers. This danger, always a possibility under the rule of reason, may 
be an expensive, time-consuming probability in the context of vertical distribution 
restraints. 
